SINCE the early days of British colonial rule, India has lived under a series of draconian preventive detention laws. Currently, the National Security Act of 1980 (NSA) is the broadest and most widely abused of these laws. The stated goal of the act is to prevent individuals from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain state objectives, including national security, public order, and the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.¹ It provides for the detention of individuals for up to a year by local authorities without charges, a trial, or other rights that accused criminals take for granted in India and elsewhere.²

Ever since its inception the National Security Act has been widely abused by governmental authorities in order to detain trade union leaders, human rights activists, political opponents, underprivileged castes, and ordinary criminal suspects for long periods of time without the minimal safeguards that the Indian Constitution and international law demand.

The National Security Act is valid across the whole of India, with the exception of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In that state there exists an analogous law, the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (1978) that has also been widely abused. However, this article will focus solely on the National Security Act.

 

 

The preamble of the NSA states, ‘In the prevailing situation of communal disharmony, social tensions, extremist activities, industrial unrest and increasing tendency on the part of various interested parties to engineer agitation on different issues, it was considered necessary that the law and order situation in the country is tackled in a most determined and effective way. The anti-social and anti-national elements including secessionist communal and pro-caste elements and also other elements who adversely influence and affect the services essential to the community pose a gave challenge to the lawful authority and sometimes even hold the society to ransom.’

Note the emphasis on the ‘prevailing situation’ in the country in 1980. The situation is certainly not the same today, yet there have been only five amendments to the NSA in the past 20 years, all of which were passed between 1984 and 1988. The main focus of these amendments has been to increase the power of the state to act without judicial supervision in Punjab and Chandigarh. There is no definition given of either ‘national security’, ‘public order’, or ‘supplies and services essential to the community’.

Section 3 of the NSA empowers the government to issue a detention order if satisfied with respect to any person that such an order is necessary. The ‘subjective satisfaction’ of the detaining authority is the statutory requirement for the exercise of this power. This means that a detention is valid if the detaining authority is actually satisfied that the person should be detained, regardless of whether the detention is objectively warranted or not.

The use of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as the sine qua non of such a law has been widely disapproved of among the international community ever since the landmark House of Lords decision in Liversidge v. Anderson.³ With this standard, courts have been crippled in their capacity to review effectively detention orders made pursuant to this act. In the end, this language precludes any adequate judicial oversight of the executive’s exercise of this extraordinary power. The meagre and ineffectual doctrines elaborated by the courts provide ample evidence on this point.

 

 

The Indian courts have developed little in the way of preconditions for the formation of the executive’s subjective satisfaction. The courts have elaborated only vacuous standards. In Anil Dey v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court held that the veil of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be lifted by the courts with a view to evaluating its ‘objective sufficiency’; however, the satisfaction must be ‘honest and real and not fanciful and imaginary.’⁴ The executive is required to ‘apply its mind’ to the decision to issue a detention order.⁵ Such standards are wholly inadequate to the task of defining an adequate and effective jurisprudence of preventive detention.

The standard rarely employed by courts is that the materials used to inform the satisfaction of the executive must be of ‘rational probative value and must not be extraneous to the purpose of detention.’⁶ Only standards of this sort could accommodate full judicial review of detention orders.

More often the court liberally construes the satisfaction of the executive. ‘The court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the detaining authority by applying an objective test to decide the necessity of detention for a specified purpose.’⁷ NSA establishes a substantive standard that creates an impossible procedural burden.⁸

 

 

The executive is required by the dictates of natural justice and international human rights law to weigh and scrutinise the material made available to them and only then to reach the conclusion as to whether the detention is necessary. The judiciary, however, must possess the institutional and statutory capacity to review this process, particularly when the said process might result in the deprivation of fundamental liberties.

Section 4 prescribes the procedure to be followed in the execution of detention orders in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973. The mode of execution of warrants of arrest is provided under sections 70 to 81 of the CrPC. The CrPC requires that warrants of arrest be in writing, signed by the officer of the court issuing the warrant and bearing the seal of the court (section 70). Section 75 of the CrPC directs the police officer or other person executing the warrant of arrest to notify the person to be arrested of the substance of the warrant, and if so requested, to show the said person the warrant.

The police officer making the arrest is required by section 76 of the CrPC to bring the person against whom the warrant is issued before the court without unnecessary delay, and under no circumstances should this delay exceed 24 hours from the time of arrest. In fact, as provided for in section 10 of the NSA, it generally takes up to three weeks for a detenu’s case to be presented before the advisory board.

Section 5-A establishes that the grounds of detention are always to be treated as severable. This means that the grounds of detention offered for any order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of the said grounds. So long as even one valid ground is available the detention order must be sustained. The amendment to the NSA came as a response to several court rulings in which detention orders were set aside upon a court finding that one or more of the stated grounds of detention was vague, non-existent, irrelevant or invalid.

These detention orders were held invalid because the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was ex facie based on the grounds offered in the detention order as a whole. The courts refused to speculate as to whether the detention order resulted from the cumulative effect of the grounds listed in the order or whether each ground mentioned would have constituted independently viable grounds for detention.

 

 

The amended section leaves no room for the courts to manoeuvre on the issue. Even if an individual is detained because of clearly invalid reasons, he will not be released so long as the government authorities manage to put in one of the grounds for detention in the detention order.⁹

Section 6 further limits the power of courts to review detention orders. According to section 6, no detention order can be held inoperative or invalid on the grounds that the person to be detained is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the detaining authority or on grounds that the place of detention is outside these limits. Section 7 provides a punishment of a fine and up to a year in prison for absconding or failing to comply with an order of detention.

Section 8 requires disclosure of the grounds of detention to the detenu as soon as may be, but ordinarily no later than five days from the time of the arrest. In ‘exceptional circumstances’ the grounds of detention can be withheld for up to ten days after the date of the arrest. Section 8 also requires, in consonance with Article 22(5) of the Constitution, that the detenu be given the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order. Subsection (2) of section 8 clarifies these duties of the government by stating that nothing in subsection (1) shall require the detaining authority to disclose facts which it considers against the public interest to disclose.

 

 

Sections 9-12 deal with the advisory boards that have been set up by the executive authorities to automatically review detentions under the NSA. Section 9 provides that all advisory boards should consist of three persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as High Court judges. At least one member of every board must be an active or former High Court judge, who will also serve as chairman. Section 10 states that the appropriate government must provide the advisory board with the grounds on which the detention was made and any representation by the detenu within three weeks of the date of detention except where otherwise provided in the act.

Section 11 provides that the advisory board must submit its report on the appropriateness of the detention within seven weeks of the date of detention of the person concerned. Section 11 also explicitly states that nothing contained within it shall signify that a detenu is entitled to legal representation in any matter connected to the advisory board. Section 12 simply states that when the advisory board reports that there is sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the government may then continue the detention of the person for as long as it sees fit. When the advisory board reports that there is insufficient cause for detention, then the detenu must be released forthwith.

Section 13 sets the maximum period a person may be detained at 12 months. The Punjab and Union Territory of Chandigarh Amendment of 1984 extended the maximum period to two years for those regions. Section 14 provides that a detention order may at any time be revoked or modified, as long as the modification does not extend the period of detention beyond 12 months from the date of the original arrest.

Section 15 directs that the appropriate government may, at any time, order the release of a person being detained under a detention order for a specific period of time, and that they may base this release on conditions which the detenu would have to accept. Section 16 bars any legal proceedings against the central or state government and its agents for actions taken in good faith pursuant to this act. Sections 17 and 18 state that the NSA will not affect detentions under prior state acts and repeal the National Security Ordinance of 1980.

 

 

According to the U.S. State Department, between 1980 and 1990 an incredible two-thirds of the 16,000 detentions made under the National Security Act were deemed invalid by either the advisory boards or the courts.¹⁰

As the number of detentions had risen in the 1990s, the proportion of detentions being deemed invalid has remained at a high level. According to statistics from the website of the ruling BJP party, out of the 3,783 individuals detained under the National Security Act in Maharashtra in 1993, 478 were released after scrutiny by the state, 1,332 were released by the advisory board, and 932 were released by the court.¹¹ In other words, the NSA was being misused or abused by the executive authorities in 72.5% of all cases.

 

 

It is a measure of the insensitivity of politicians to these abuses that the BJP views these statistics with satisfaction – the headline of the article is ‘Respect for Human Rights is Hallmark of Indian Ethos’. In fact, while these statistics do show a fair degree of independence among the judiciary and the advisory boards, they also show that the vast majority of detenus were originally detained illegally. And given the subjective satisfaction standard that the courts have developed, one can safely assume that when a court or advisory board actually decides to overturn a detention, it is because the executive authorities grossly abused their powers.

Although more recent figures have not been circulated, anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of detentions being declared illegal has remained at similarly high levels since then. The situation is made all the more troublesome by the fact that those who are wrongly detained have no legal right to be compensated for their time in prison, even when a court or advisory board declares that the detention has violated their fundamental right to liberty.

If the act was being used as intended, to combat serious threats to the nation’s well-being, one would also expect to see the most detentions in states where there is a high level of violence and disorder of some sort, whether it be secessionist, communal, or caste-based. This is not the case, either. Studies have consistently failed to show any connection between the level of violence in a state and the number of detentions under the NSA.

Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh are well known for their enthusiastic use of preventive detention under the NSA even though they are far from the most violent or disorderly regions of India.¹² During 1999, a large number of detenus under the National Security Act were from Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, states where there was no real problem with insurgency or national security at the time.¹³

One can lump the abuses of the National Security Act into two broad categories. First, there are the detentions that are based on political or ideological differences. This goes against the basic spirit of the Indian Constitution and has a chilling effect on the fundamental freedoms. No right-minded person would condone this type of blatant abuse, and the courts have generally overturned such detentions (although not before the political prisoner has spent many months in prison).

Second, there is the detention of suspected criminals for acts that can properly be dealt with by the ordinary criminal law. Although this type of abuse receives little or no publicity, it has been widespread since the NSA was passed in 1980.¹⁴

 

 

The NSA has, since its inception, been used far too often as a political weapon of those in power against their political or ideological enemies. The vague provisions of the NSA have allowed the disposition of government officials to transform the legal understanding of ‘national security’ and ‘public order’. The People’s Union for Civil Liberties reported in 1981 that: ‘A list of the prominent amongst those detained under the NSA reads like a Who’s Who of political activists and trade unionists.’¹⁵

Among the first detained under the National Security Act were A.K. Roy, MP and K.S. Chatterjee, MLA, both of whom were active members of the Marxist Coordination Committee and prominent trade union activists. During the non-gazetted officers strike of December 1980 in Andhra Pradesh, G. Ramamoorthy was arrested and detained under NSA. K. Guruva Reddy and Vera Reddy of the Communist Party of India were detained in February 1981. Peasant leader Pujerla Sambiah was arrested in Andhra Pradesh for ‘actively organising peasants and agriculatural labourers to revolt against landowners.’ The Singareni mines strike led to the arrest of four unionists of the Indian Federation of Trade Unions. The President of the Tamil Nadu Agriculturalists Association, C. Narayanaswami Naidu, was arrested as well. Three trade union leaders from Madhya Pradesh, Shankar Guha Niyogi, Sahdev Sahu, and other activists of the Chattisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh were held under the provisions of NSA.

 

 

Amnesty International reported recently that human rights activist Narayan Reddy, who was peacefully campaigning against the location of a steel plant in Ganjam district of Orissa, was detained under the NSA on 23 July 1996.¹⁶ Additionally, several activists engaged in development activities with tribal communities of Rayagada district of Orissa were reportedly threatened by government officials with detention under the NSA in late 1998 in connection with activities in support of the local tribal community against construction of a bauxite mine.¹⁷

The District Collector and Superintendent of Police of Rayagada district were reported as saying that those opposing the establishment of aluminium plants in the area should be imprisoned under the NSA, which allows for administrative detention for a period of up to one year. In a report submitted in April 1998, the Collector is reported to have argued that, ‘when the development of the people is at stake, the government has to choose either of the two: continuance of such NGOs or large-scale industrialisation of the district.’¹⁸

 

 

Amnesty International reports that in Assam, human rights defenders associated with the Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti (MASS) have been regularly harassed and detained on charges of having links with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), an armed opposition group, even though none of these charges have ever been proved in a court of law and none of those detained has been convicted.¹⁹

In August 1997, four human rights defenders and journalists were arrested after speaking out against the establishment of a Unified Command (under which increasing powers were granted to the armed forces in Assam) and against government corruption. They were repeatedly charged with having links with ULFA and publishing statements issued by such groups. Three of them – Ajit Kumar Bhuyan, Lachit Bordoloi and Prakash Mahanta, all members of MASS – were subsequently charged under the National Security Act.²⁰ This was not the first time Bhuyan had been detained under the NSA. In 1992, he was detained under the NSA, but on that occasion was released on the day the Guwahati High Court was to pass judgement on the legality of his detention.²¹

On 23 February 1999, according to Amnesty International,²² four other MASS activists were reportedly arrested by police while putting up posters to advertise a forthcoming meeting of MASS. To protest these arrests, Dhirawati Choudhury, a female MASS activist started a fast along with other protesters. Police reportedly beat several of the protesters with lathis and tore her clothes off. Twelve women protesters, including Choudhury were arrested and taken to Bongaigaon police station where they were allegedly subjected to further beatings. On 1 March Dhirawati Choudhury was detained under the National Security Act. She was released on the recommendation of the advisory board on 29 March.

 

 

In the case of N. Bishewar v. State of Manipur,²³ Bishewar, an activist for the Meitei tribal peoples, appealed his political imprisonment under the auspices of the National Security Act to the Gauhati High Court. The stated grounds for his detention were that he was a founding member of the political party, Poramlen Apunba. The party’s activities were non-violent and it was not banned by the state. In fact, the court asserted that the party’s objective was merely to rename Manipur as ‘Kanglelipak’ (homeland of the Meiteis),²⁴ hardly the type of revolutionary goal that would threaten public order. The court ordered that the detenu be released.

Shyambhai Urfe, Irfanbhai Asgarali Engineer and Virsingbhai Vishrambhai Patel were detained under the National Security Act in January of 1992 in the Dangs district of Gujarat.²⁵ Both detenus had been involved in the fight to protect their traditional lands. They had formed the Bhoomiheen Kisan Hakk Samraksha Samiti (committee for the protection of rights of landless farmers) to protect their right to cultivate lands that had been declared as protected under the provisions of the Indian Forests (Conservation) Act, 1980.²⁶

Lok Adhikar Sangh, a Gujarati civil liberties organisation, filed a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of the two detenus with the Gujarat High Court. The court had little doubt that these detentions were politically motivated: ‘It is clear that the detenus are working for the protection of the rights of the tribals. Thus it is evident that the detenus are not anti-social elements. It may be that according to the detaining authority the activities of the detenus may be unlawful. But the fact remains that the activities alleged in relation to each detenu is such that the detenu and his associates are trying to organise the poor, ignorant tribals who form part of the disadvantaged and deprived section of the society.’²⁷

The court overturned the detention order and upbraided the authorities, saying that in modern India, ‘the "state" is not free to act in any manner it likes.’²⁸

 

 

In September 1999, Sahayog, an organization working on AIDS education in the Kumaon hills of Uttar Pradesh published a pamphlet entitled ‘AIDS Aur Hum’²⁹ (AIDS and Us) which described certain risky sexual acts portraying what it saw as the licentious sexual practices of the area. Stoked by hatemongering politicians, the offices of Sahayog were attacked by local residents on 20 April 2000. Instead of providing protection to the activists, Union Minister Murli Manohar Joshi, a native of the Kumaon area, spoke out publicly against the group and demanded that strong measures be taken against them.

Subsequently, on 9 May 1999 the National Security Act was invoked against four members of Sahayog: Jasodhara Das Gupta (Secretary), Abhijit Das Gupta (Coordinator), Subita Shah and Surendra Dhapola (both Sahayog staff). While the Sahayog staff may have been guilty of poor judgment in the distribution of their pamphlet, they were clearly not threats to national security or public order. Their imprisonment under the National Security Act was a politically motivated detention.³⁰

The NSA has been used to detain trade unionists in Uttar Pradesh.³¹ Shailendra Dubey, Raja Ram Mishra, and A.K. Singh, leaders of the Uttar Pradesh Powermen Joint Action Committee (UPPJAC) were all detained under the NSA during January 2000. At the time, UPPJAC had been leading a strike of power workers to protest the proposed trifurcation of the State Electricity Board (UPSEB).

 

 

Politically motivated abuses of the National Security Act draw immediate disapproval from all those who care about freedom and liberty. However, the use of the NSA as a substitute for the ordinary criminal law is equally dangerous to the fundamental rights of Indian citizens, and is probably a more prevalent type of abuse.³²

Part of the problem lies in the inherent vagueness of terms like ‘national security’ and ‘public order’. However, some of the crimes which have been used as grounds for detention under the NSA are hardly of momentous import. Individuals have been illegally detained under the NSA for illicit involvement in the liquor trade,³³ stealing a scooter³⁴ and the mere carrying of a concealed firearm in a public place.³⁵

While the use of the NSA for political purposes as described in the previous section has by and large been condemned by the Indian courts, the use of the National Security Act to shortcut the criminal justice system has unfortunately received a degree of judicial approval. The courts have upheld the use of the NSA to detain individuals for the commission of one act of vandalism,³⁶ the maintenance of a large stock of beef tallow,³⁷ a single act of dacoity on a national highway,³⁸ and the single act of breaking into an open railway wagon and removing three bales of empty jute bags.³⁹ While such behaviour is, if proven in a court of law, clearly illegal, there is no way any of these acts would reach the level of disturbing public order or national security that would necessitate preventive detention.

From a theoretical perspective, the courts have struggled to distinguish between ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’. In the leading case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar,⁴⁰ the full bench of the Supreme Court suggested a model of three concentric circles, with the largest representing ‘law and order’, the middle one representing ‘public order’ and the smallest representing ‘security of state’. An act can affect ‘law and order’ but not ‘public order’ and similarly an act can affect ‘public order’ but not necessarily ‘security of state’.

 

 

More recently, in Smt. Angoori Devi for Ram Ratan v. Union of India and Others,⁴¹ the Supreme Court, referring to the NSA, wrote: ‘The impact on "public order" and "law and order" depends upon the nature of the act, the place where it is committed and motive force behind it. If the act is confined to an individual without directly or indirectly affecting the tempo of the life of the community, it may be a matter of law and order only. But where the gravity of the act is otherwise and likely to endanger the public tranquility, it may fall within the orbit or public order.’

In the 21st century, it is inconceivable that a civilised country would use preventive detention as a substitute for the criminal law. However, with the insincere actions of some local authorities, the court’s confused jurisprudence, and the inherent vagueness of the phrase ‘public order’, that is exactly what is happening.

 

 

It is abundantly clear that India faces threats to its national security and to public order. The most serious of these is the militant insurgency groups operating in and around Kashmir. However, this threat is not dealt with by the National Security Act, which is inoperative in Jammu and Kashmir (another, more stringent preventive detention law, the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, which was passed in 1978, covers the area). In North East India, the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act operates.

Given that India occasionally staggers through spasmodic bouts of violence and disorder, it is possible that very narrowly tailored preventive detention laws with stringent judicial controls could be appropriate to counter such threats, at least in times of particular unrest. (i) Increasing the accountability of the governmental authorities, (ii) tailoring the law more narrowly to the truly serious threats to India’s security, and (iii) refining the language of the NSA so as to make it less vague and, therefore, less susceptible to abuses and creative interpretations from executive authorities, are fundamental if abuses are to be checked.

 

Endnotes:

1. National Security Act (1980), Statement of Objects and Reasons.

2. Id., section 3.

3. (1942) AC 206.

4. AIR 1974 SC 832.

5. See, e.g., Naresh Chandra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 SC 1335.

6. Lalit Rajkhowa v. State of Assam, 1984 Cri. L.J. 1869 (Gau).

7. Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 550.

8. For example, in Nabani and Alani Saha v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 1706, the Supreme Court held that although relying upon two stray incidents spread over four months and insufficient to justify detention, the detention order was impervious to judicial scrutiny since it is beyond the powers of the judiciary to determine the sufficiency of the grounds upon which the executive’s subjective satisfaction was based.

9. See Teja Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2000 Cri. L.J. 244, 249.

10. India Human Rights Practices, 1993, U.S. Department of State: http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/privacy/privacy_international/country_reports/1993_us_state_dept_ human_rights_guide/india.txt.

11. ‘Respect for Human Rights is Hallmark of Indian Ethos’ by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, at www.bjp.org/philo.htm.

12. India Human Rights Practices, 1993, U.S. Department of State: http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/privacy /privacy_international/country_ reports/1993_us_state_dept_human_ rights_guide/india.txt.

13. Amnesty International Report 1999: India, published on the web at http://www.amnestyusa.org/ ailib/aireport/ar99/asa20.htm.

14. One study conducted by V.S. Rekhi of Aligarh Muslim University found that out of 224 reported cases of preventive detention brought to the court, 56 of the cases were purely politically or ideologically motivated (these were generally based on membership in a particular political party or trade union), and another 151 were related to crimes generally thought of as within the sphere of the ordinary criminal law (the most common crimes were theft of railway equipment, arson, aiding dacoits, and theft). Only 17 of the detentions were grounded on the type of action that would seriously affect public order or national security, like terrorism and fomenting communal unrest. (Iqbal Ansari, ‘Preventive Detention: Its Incompatibility with the Rule of Law’, in A.R. Desai (ed.), Violation of Democratic Rights in India, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1986, p. 97-98).

15. People’s Union for Civil Liberties Bulletin, May 1981, p. 3.

16. Amnesty International Report: ‘Persecuted for Challenging Injustice: Human Rights Defenders in India’ (April, 2000), Part II, Ch. 1. Published in full at www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/2000/asa/32000800.htm.

17. One of these was Sadan Mahji, a leader of the Paroja-Kondha tribe. For his story and a good analysis of the issue, see ‘Confrontation Mine’ in Down to Earth 7( 22), 15 April 1999. Published in full at www.oneworld.org/cse/html/dte/dte990415/dte_srep.htm.

18. Amnesty International Report: ‘Persecuted for Challenging Injustice: Human Rights Defenders in India’ (April, 2000), Part II, Ch. 1. Published in full at www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/2000/asa/32000800.htm.

19. Id., at Part III, Ch. 7.

20. Id.

21. See ‘Ajit Kumar Bhuyan: A Prisoner of Conscience in Assam, 1997’ by Jugal Kalita. Published in full at www.cs.uccs.edu/~kalita/assam/huan-rights/ajit-bhuyan.html.

22. Amnesty International Report: ‘Persecuted for Challenging Injustice: Human Rights Defenders in India’ (April, 2000), Part III, Ch. 7. Published in full at www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/2000/asa/32000800.htm.

23. 1994 Cri. L.J. 3675 (Gau).

24. Id., at 3677.

25. See Lok Adhikar Sangh v. State of Gujarat and Others. [1993(2)] XXXIV (2) GLR 1802.

26. Id., at 1802, 1803.

27. Id., at 1807.

28. Id.

29. As described in ‘The Sahayog affair’ by Rajeev Dhavan, The Hindu, 19 May 2000.

30. For a more detailed analysis of the Sahayog affair, see article by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties entitled ‘AIDS aur hum in the Eye of the Storm’, available at their website at http://www.pucl.org/bulletin/june-2000/aids-aur-hum.htm.

31. See Calcutta-on-net News, 25 January 2000: ‘Talks fail: UP power crisis deepens’ at http://www.calonline.com/jan00/25jan00.html.

32. See footnote 18.

33. Kanchhedi Khan v. District Magistrate, (1983) 1 Crimes 607 (MP)(DB).

34. Ravinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 11 Cri. L.J. 2339 (P & H).

35. Sudarshan Tukaram Mhate v. R.D. Tyagi, Commr. of Police, Thane, 1990 Cri. L.J. 1964.

36. Alijan Mian v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, AIR 1983 SC 1130.

37. J.R. Gupta v. State of Punjab, 1984 Cri. L.J. 694 (Punj and Hary).

38. Ranjanlal Sharma v. District Magistrate, Moradabad, 1984 Cri. L.J. 954: 1984 All Cri. R. 256.

39. Debu Mahto v. State of West Bengal, AIR GET CITE.

40. AIR 196 SC 740; (1966 Cri. L.J. 608).

41. 1 SCC 385 (1989).